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DISCUSSION
The struggle for legislative 
powers
The need for reform in the East African Community
A power struggle is ongoing in the East African Community – 
a struggle for legislative power. In the most recent edition of 
“Law and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America”, I 
examine the ongoing tensions on the power to initiate bills 
in East Africa’s regional integration mechanism. Legislative 
power is shared between the East African Legislative 
Assembly (EALA), the legislative organ of the East African 
Community (EAC), and the EAC Council of ministers (the 
Council), the policy organ of the EAC. The Treaty for the 
Establishment of the East African Community of 1999 gives 
both the EALA and the Council powers to initiate bills for 
EAC legislation. The tension between these two organs 
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primarily occurred because the EALA initiated bills on 
matters under negotiation or already opposed or agreed 
upon by the Council, hence reopening the concluded 
negotiations or legislating on matters the Council deems 
outside the scope of the Treaty. I argue that the cordial and 
effective working relationship between the Council and 
EALA is paramount for their better performance in the 
interest of the EAC. Short of this, tension will affect the 
timely attainment of a prosperous, competitive, secure 
stable and politically united EAC.
Currently, the Treaty is being considered for amendments to 
address this tension by allowing the Council to first approve 
private members’ bills before being submitted to the 
assembly. On the other hand, it is also proposed that the 
amendment is not necessary as it will interfere with the 
principle of separation of powers. Instead it is proposed that 
the existing dormant provisions of the Treaty, particularly 
Articles 49(2) and 65 on relations between EALA and national 
assemblies as well as Article 63 on withholding assent by 
Heads of State on the controversial bills should be used.
Rare legislative powers
Coincidentally, as far as legislative function is concerned, 
EALA stands out in sharp – and admirable – contrast most 
other regional parliamentary bodies in Africa and the world, 
which rarely have legislative functions. In this context, the 
only real yardstick to measure EALA is the European 
Parliament despite various differences between the two. Bills 
under EALA are initiated either by the Council sending a 
motion to the house or through private bills by individual 
members or the committee of the house. Article 59(1) of the 
Treaty allows any member of EALA to propose any motion or 
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introduce any bill in the house. Rule 64 of the East African 
Legislative Assembly Rules of Procedure of 2001 adds that 
every committee of the house within its area of competence 
and every member of EALA has a right to move a private 
members’ bill. From its existence to date, EALA has passed 47 
legislations, the majority of which originated from private 
members’ bills. Under the European Union, the legislative 
process involves several institutions including the European 
Commission,  the Council of the European Union, the 
European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, and the 
Economic and Social Committee.
Empowering the Council to approve bills?
I submit that the proposed amendment to the Treaty to 
empower the Council to approve private members’ bills does 
neither delete nor destroy the stature, validity, legitimacy or 
effectiveness of the private members’ bills or EALA. Enabling 
the Council to jointly approve together with EALA private 
motions is a sound move and should not be seen as giving 
the Council tyrannical decisive legislative functions at the 
expense of EALA. It is clear from the experience of the 
European Union, that this will ensure smooth coordination 
between the two organs of the community, and will not 
violate the foundational ideals of the principle of separation 
of powers enshrined in the Treaty, to wit, avoid autocracy. It 
is also an inconvenient truth that EALA does not enjoy a 
presumptive legitimacy of a representative democracy in 
strict sense because its members are not popularly elected. 
They are elected by national parliaments or assemblies, 
outside of its members, representing as much as feasible the 
various political parties represented in parliament, shades of 
opinion, gender and special interest groups in that partner 
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state, and in accordance with such procedure as each 
national assembly may determine.
Moreover, since EAC is not a state, the doctrine of 
separation of powers is of limited use, more so, to a state-
centric intergovernmental organization like the EAC. The 
doctrine was primarily not invented to promote efficiency 
that is central in regional integration projects. Instead, the 
concept of institutional balance of power among the EAC 
institutions through a specific conferment of powers is more 
ideal for the evolution and the efficiency of the EAC. 
Withholding assent by Heads of State on the controversial 
bills will in the long run create more problems than solving 
the current problem. At best, the power of assent can 
prevent the operationalization of a bill but cannot save 
resources used in passing the said bill and squabbles 
associated with such a withhold.
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